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Massie, Robert K. Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea.
New York: Random House, 2003. 880pp. $35

This work is the sequel to Pulitzer
Prize–winning author Robert Massie’s
Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the
Coming of the Great War (Random
House, 1991). It is a sweeping narrative
of World War I at sea. While it focuses
primarily on the struggle between the
main German and British fleets, it also
examines the German U-boat campaign, other revolutions in undersea
weaponry, the pivotal role of good intelligence, and the broad geographic
scope of the war. The book provides a
clear sense of how important the clash
of British and German navies was to the
war’s eventual outcome, and it illustrates how Winston Churchill’s dramatic description of Admiral John
Jellicoe, commander in chief of the
British Grand Fleet, as “the only commander who could lose the war in an
afternoon” could be an accurate one.
This is also a cautionary tale of failures
and missed opportunities. In the earliest stages of the conflict, we see both
sides baffled when their opponent’s actions do not match prewar assumptions. The German naval strategy, for
example, was based on the certainty
that the British would immediately attack the German fleet or institute a
close-in blockade. When this did not
happen, Massie writes, “the premise on
which the Germans had based their
strategy was overturned.” Consequently,
German admirals “discovered that they
did not know what to do.” When the
German fleet, on the other hand, did not
come charging out for a fight, the British
public, expecting another Trafalgar,
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became annoyed with the navy’s “unwillingness” to act. Each side scrambled
to formulate a new strategy. There is a
clear lesson here—flexibility, not plans
set in stone.
The author shows that the most costly
strategic failure, however, was the German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. By no means is this a
groundbreaking interpretation, but in
these pages the course of action leading
to the decision is made clear. The failure of the vaunted High Seas Fleet to
carry out its anticipated task of whittling
down the Grand Fleet painted the Germans into a strategic corner from which
they eventually saw unrestricted submarine warfare as their only alternative.
Despite these explanations of strategy,
Castles of Steel is also a readable and
dramatic work. The narrative rushes
along, with a desperate hunt for the enemy in the vast Pacific, with fleets and
squadrons that speed toward each other
without a hint of the other’s presence,
and with battle cruisers that appear out
of the mist to shell unsuspecting coastal
villages and then slip quietly away. Action in the North Sea, the book’s primary theater, culminates in a gripping
four-chapter account of Jutland. Meanwhile, the fog of battle makes command
and control difficult, even with the new
technology of wireless communication.
In the words of British admiral David
Beatty, the war at sea became “a conflict
with the unexpected,” despite the bestlaid plans. The reader can sense the
drama and urgency born of this uncertainty on every page.
Yet while acknowledging the great narrative allure of vast fleets fighting for
control of the seas, some readers might
question the relevance of such a lengthy
analysis. After all, was it not the overall
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experience of the First World War that
marked the passing of the Mahanian
ideal of climactic shoot-outs between
battleships and pointed to new realities
in naval strategy? Almost from the time
the echo of the guns in the North Sea
faded, naval strategy shifted to things
radically different from decisive battles
between capital ships. The strategic
framework of Forward . . . from the Sea
appears to have little in common with
Jutland or Dogger Bank.
Nevertheless, the struggle to adapt to
this shift is part of the experience we see
unfolding in Castles of Steel. Jellicoe
came to realize that his fleet’s primary
purpose “was not destruction of the enemy fleet, but command of the sea with
the accompanying ability to maintain
the blockade.” Ultimately, we see a successful adjustment on the strategic level
by the British, contrasted with a complete failure of German grand strategy.
Finally, this is clearly a well researched
book. Telling figures on German economic imports show precisely the effect
of the British blockade. Information on
the coal consumption of ships could
easily have been left out, but because of
its inclusion, we have a much better understanding of a ship’s limitations and
abilities. The reader comes to know the
characters involved in the drama, and
we can thereby understand their
choices better. Robert Massie’s careful
attention is evident throughout the
book and contributes to its stature as a
seminal volume in understanding
World War I at sea, as well as the evolution of seapower and strategy in the
early twentieth century.
DAVID A. SMITH

Department of History,
Baylor University
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Mayor, Adrienne. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows &
Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare
in the Ancient World. New York: Overlook, 2003.
319pp. $27.95

Adrienne Mayor’s recent effort is a
comprehensive review of the use of biological and chemical weapons by ancient cultures. Mayor is an independent
scholar of the classics and folklore who
lives in Princeton, New Jersey. She has
been published in MHQ: Quarterly
Journal of Military History and various
archeology journals, and she is the author of The First Fossil Hunters: Paleontology in Greek and Roman Times
(Princeton Univ. Press, 2000); a similarly titled program is scheduled for the
History Channel in July 2004.
This work describes in detail the use of
weapons of mass destruction by the ancient cultures of Greece, Rome, China,
India, Islamic regions, and Mongolia.
Mayor presents a much needed update
of the historical use of these weapons. If
modern scientists appear to understand
the nature and effects of chemical and
biological weapons through their expertise in biochemical and molecular sciences and epidemiology, ancient
civilizations created and used similar
weapons by empirical evidence alone.
The (mythical) first use of a biological
weapon in the ancient world was by
Hercules, who dipped his arrows in the
venom of the slain Hydra. Ancient
myths may also reflect the realities of
their time. Descriptions of poisoned
wounds in the Trojan War accurately
depict the effects of snake venom and
other toxins, lending confirmation of
the use of this type of weapon. In AD
198–99, the citizens of Hatra (the
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